Introduction
The construction of a European 'Banking Union' is one of the most significant developments in European integration since the agreement on the Maastricht Treaty. the 'bail-in' of struggling and failing banks which enable authorities to recapitalise a failing bank by writing-down liabilities and / or converting them to equity with the aim of continuing a bank as a going concern, decreasing financial system instability and giving authorities the opportunity to reorganise the bank or resolve it (European Commission 2014).
In July 2013, the Commission proposed a regulation for the creation of the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) (European Commission, 2013) which in a considerably modified form was agreed by government leaders in December 2013 (Council of Ministers, 2013) and then adopted by the Council and the European Parliament in March 2014. The Commission had previously proposed a directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) (European Commission 2010), which was stalled.
The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) began operation in September 2012 to replace eventually the temporary European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) (Hodson 2013) . It was envisaged that, subject to certain conditions, the ESM could provide financial support to ailing banks and an amount was allocated specifically to Spanish banks via a national recapitalisation fund (FROB).
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However, despite these remarkable achievements, the move to a Banking Union was delayed in 2013 due to differences over the design and operation of the SRM, between the German government and a few northern European Member States, on the one hand, and the EU institutions, France and euro periphery Member States, on the other. While many had previously hoped that the Banking Union would be up and running in 2013, by the end of the year it was clear that the system would not be operational until 2015 and then in a much watered down form from what the Member States had called for in June 2012. Negotiations on the SRM centred around four specific issues: the scope and membership of the SRM, the centralisation of decisionmaking authority, the sources of funding and the mechanism's legal basis.
The SRM, together with the SSM, was designed to address what we label the 'financial inconsistent quartet', that builds on the 'financial trilemma' outlined by Dirk Schoenmaker (2011 . The trilemma examines the interplay of financial stability, cross-border banking and national financial policies, arguing that any two of the three objectives can be combined but not all three: one has to give way. While
Schoenmaker presents an economic analysis to explain the existence of the trilemma, this contribution examines national preference formation with regard to the three objectives of the trilemma and how national preferences shaped one of the main elements of Banking Union: the SRM.
We argue that in the EU there is a fourth element to be considered, namely participation in the single currency. The effective elimination of the 'lender of last resort' function at the national level in EMU and its legal elimination at the supranational level (article 127, TFEU) created greater potential for financial instability, especially in the context of the growth in cross-border banking and the rapid expansion of bank balance sheets during the first seven years of the single 5 currency. Hence, the trilemma became, for euro area Member States, an 'inconsistent quartet'. We also argue that the analytical usefulness of this concept to explain national preferences on the SRM relies upon its nuanced application to individual countries, taking into account national policy-maker concerns regarding moral hazard, with positions determined largely by Member State current account positions and national banking systems (and notably the internationalisation of national banking systems and the increased cross-border activities of banks). This contribution focuses specifically on one element of Banking Union -the SRM -although our argument also applies to the other elements (supervision, common deposit guarantee and the fiscal backstop).
Our analysis proceeds as follows. First, we summarise our understanding of the inconsistent quartet and how different EU Member States relate to this quartet given different positioning on moral hazard issues and very different national banking systems. Second, we seek to explain German reluctance on the SRM which is important because of the significant German government influence in shaping the overall design of Banking Union. Third, we examine the intergovernmental debate on the SRM and the effort of three EU institutions -the European Parliament, the Commission and the European Central Bank -to challenge German efforts to weaken the resolution mechanism and delay its coming into operation.
I. The 'inconsistent quartet' in EMU
In his seminal work, Dirk Schoenmaker's describes and analyses the 'financial trilemma ' (2011, 2013) based on the interplay of financial stability, cross-border banking and national financial policies. In the event that national governments want cross-border banking to continue, while maintaining financial stability, the logic runs, 6 they have to accept 'supranational' prudential regulation and supervision.
Schoenmaker focuses upon global bank governance but he dedicates a couple of pages in his conclusion to the need for European Banking Union. We argue that for the large majority of EU Member States, there is a fourth element to be considered, namely the single currency. Hence, the trilemma becomes an 'inconsistent quartet'.
We borrow from Padoa-Schioppa's (1982) use of the term, applied to the context of European monetary integration, just as Schoenmaker's trilemma borrows from Mundell-Fleming (Fleming 1962; Mundell 1963 ).
On the one hand, the single currency reinforced financial (including banking) integration in the euro area, with a massive rise in cross-border banking in the euro area from 1999 (see Howarth and Quaglia, 2013) . On the other hand, the single currency undermined national financial policies, because the function of lender of last resort -previously performed by the national central bank in providing liquiditycould no longer be performed effectively at either the national level or, legally at least, by the European Central Bank (ECB). Moreover, national resolution powers were constrained by EU / euro area fiscal rules. Consequently, national authorities had fewer tools at their disposal to safeguard financial stability, which encouraged them to look to supranational solutions.
The inconsistent quartet asserts that euro area Member State governments sought but could not obtain all four objectives. We assume that the maintenance of the single currency was a prioritised goal for euro area Member States -although the implications of membership for financial stability and control varied given that Member States were affected differently by lender of last resort concerns. The inconsistent quartet also leads to the hypothesis that in euro area Member States where the banking system was less internationalised and domestic banks were less 7 engaged in cross-border banking activities, interest in the supranationalisation of prudential regulation and supervision was likely to be more limited. Further, EU Member States unlikely to join the single currency in the near future -even those with highly internationalised banking systems and home to banks with an important cross-border presence such as the United Kingdom and Sweden -had less interest in joining Banking Union, in part because lender of last resort functions remained intact. States further undermined the ability of their governments to rescue or resolve failing banks (for further details, see Howarth and Quaglia, 2013 supervision, which for large systemically important banks was to be undertaken by the ECB through its new Supervisory Board in the SSM; resolution, which was to be performed by the SRM; a deposit guarantee scheme to be replaced by some kind of common European scheme; and even the lender of last resort function becoming -in addition to de facto ECB support -a European fiscal backstop for struggling and failing banks. Some argued that all of these elements were necessary in order to make Banking Union work (Gros and Schoenmaker 2014) . However, euro area Member
State governments facing the inconsistent quartet had different preferences on the various elements of a Banking Union, depending on the concern of national policy makers for moral hazard created by BU-level financial support for banks and sovereigns and the configuration of their national banking system. Preoccupation with moral hazard depended on whether a Member State was more or less likely to be a net contributor to the proposed single resolution fund and the ability of national authorities to resolve banks headquartered in the Member State. While our inconsistent quartet allows us to predict interest in a Banking Union throughout the euro area, it also helps us to explain German reluctance which stems, we argue, from moral hazard concerns but also the specific features of the German banking system, notably its limited internationalisation. 
II. Explaining German
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The agreement to allocate ESM financial support to save struggling banks also created a moral hazard for banks -already a concern at the national level in the context of widespread bail-outs in the aftermath of the international financial crisis.
The standard argument runs that banks are more likely to engage in riskier activities in the knowledge that they will be bailed out in the context of crisis. German 11 systemically important banks, EU rules on 'bail-in' (that is, initial losses imposed on both private sector bond and shareholders -BRRD Art. 37.51-52), with EU level support only at the end of a relatively long process/and difficult voting system. But these conditions and complexity led many observers to question the credibility of the mechanism and the likelihood of EU-level support, which created additional concerns about the resolution of banks and potentially undermined investor / international confidence in the long term stability of euro area periphery financial systems.
German policy-makers were also preoccupied with the compatibility of the SRM with the German Basic Law. Here, the German concern, as with the establishment of the ESM and the proposed Common Deposit Guarantee Scheme, was that German taxpayers would be required to step in to support the SRM without constitutionally required parliamentary approval. In particular, German policy makers were concerned with the transition period when national resolution funds would exist, prior to the mutualisation of these funds into a single EU fund. In particular, the German federal government favoured a two-step approach to the creation of the SRM, starting with a network of national authorities and creating a centralized authority in the future and only once EU treaties had been changed and appropriate measures enacted to protect national taxpayers.
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The BRRD and the SRM were to apply all EU-headquartered banks. The directive was to enforce losses upon share-and bondholders of all EU-headquartered banks prior to a taxpayer funded bail-out or resolution. However, it was highly unlikely that SRM funds would be needed to cover the resolution of smaller banks.
The ECB was unlikely to be in a position to force resolution upon smaller German 12 banks (notably the German Cooperative Banks or the publicly owned Sparkassen), except in the very unlikely circumstance that the Supervisory Board of the SSM sought to extend direct control over the supervision of these institutions -a possibility created in the SSM regulation in the event that the Board deemed (by a majority of its members) necessary to ensure the consistent application of 'high' supervisory standards. Member State finance ministers could also initiate the resolution through the SRM of any EU-headquartered bank but it was highly unlikely that this would involve smaller German institutions.
German reluctance on the SRM can thus be seen as stemming from the structural reality that very few of its banks would be covered. Approximately, twentyfive German banks were to be subject to direct ECB supervision: a range of commercial banks and all the remaining public sector Landesbanken. The percentage of total bank assets covered by direct ECB supervision was the lowest of any euro area (Banking Union) Member State given that the German banking system was the least concentrated in Europe. 5 Almost one-third of the euro area's banks were German, including slightly more than 420 Sparkassen (publicly owned savings banks) and 1200 Cooperative banks (2011 figures), none of which would be covered by direct ECB supervision.
Applying the 'inconsistent quartet' to Germany, we would expect less interest in Banking Union generally and, more specifically, in the creation of the SRM - The draft legislation on the SRM was criticised from both sides. For some, it did not go far enough in that it failed to propose the establishment of a true Single
Resolution Authority, which would have required Treaty revision. Hence, responsibilities were split between several layers of decision-making (Deloitte 2013 ).
The Commission was assigned the ultimate decision-making power on whether or not to initiate a resolution. The SRB was tasked with planning resolutions, whereas national authorities were in charge of executing resolutions under national law. The actions of the SRB were contingent on the decision of the ECB / SSM to signal that a bank was in difficulty. Hence, the SSM's internal decision-making structure and its interaction with national authorities would form a further layer within the SRM (Deloitte 2013) . Numerous observers, the ECB and the Commission itself had argued with great regularity that during crisis, clarity and speed in decision-making were crucial for bank crisis management. Nonetheless, the Commission proposed a multilayered SRM with many veto points.
For other critics, the draft legislation gave too much power to the Commission, which would decide whether and when to place a bank into resolution. The head of a Bavarian banking association went so far as to liken the Commission's proposals to 'enabling acts', the laws that the Nazis used to seize power. 12 The German government challenged the Commission's draft on legal grounds, arguing that the Commission had overstepped its authority and that a treaty change was required for had no formal role. However, the EP retained some leverage on the side agreement, because of its co-decision power on the SRM regulation.
To further complicate negotiations, the version of the regulation adopted by the EP in January 2014 was significantly different from that agreed by the Council.
MEPs restated the requests that 'all banks must be treated equally, irrespective of which country they are established in, and that the system must be credible and efficient ' (European Parliament 2014a Resolution Board would ask the ECB take such a decision and if the ECB declined to do so, then the Board itself would take the decision. The ECB was therefore to be the main 'triggering' authority but the Board might also play a role if the ECB was reluctant or hesitated to act (European Parliament 2014b).
The main issues in the negotiations on the SRM concerned the centralisation of decision-making power, the scope of the SRM, the sources of funding and the legal basis of the new mechanism. German opposition to the Commission's draft directive on the SRM stemmed from concerns over moral hazard both for banks and for sovereigns, legal difficulties and the structure of the Germany banking system. More crudely put, the German government disliked both having to pay for the closure of 'squaring' the inconsistent quartet was and would continue to be highly contentious and complicated. Future institutional and procedural modifications were almost inevitable and the road to an effective Banking Union remained a steep ascent.
